So I recently listened to a wonderful, non-academic lecture by Anthony Paul Smith (who blogs at the consistently stimulating An und für sich) on grey ecology entitled "Is the City a Machine for the Making of Gods?" Although the focus of the lecture was a critique of apocalyptic "green" ideology (via a clever deployment of Heidegger and Bergson), one of the elements that I found most intriguing was Smith's appeal -- almost in passing -- to the idea of an ethical unconscious. (Supposedly, the idea traces all the way back to Deleuze, via Philip Goodchild's Theology of Money... But I know next to nothing about Deleuze and Goodchild, so it's new ground for me.)
The idea's implementation goes something like this: Instead of forcing the consumer to consciously fret about ethical decisions ("I have to make sure that I consciously spend my money on goods that reflect ethical stances with which I agree, I have to consciously choose to purchase chickens that weren't boxed up in tiny cages, etc."), Smith suggests that we simply make certain actions illegal -- for example, the raising of chickens in repulsively dark, tiny, filthy cages, etc -- so that the consumer is has no other option than to choose ethically. In other words, to move the ethical choice from the sphere of the conscious to the sphere of the unconscious.
Now, at first glance this certainly reeks of some sort of authoritarianism (even totalitarianism -- "You must like being forced to choose ethically!"), but this is also where Smith provides the greatest insight: he points out that, although we may object to the reduction of our "free will" by moving the ethical from the conscious to the unconscious, money already acts as an ethically unconscious mediator. In other words, the use of money already orients our ethical actions in a certain direction. We choose the chicken that has been raised in a cramped cage not because of some conscious ethical choice, but rather because of a conscious choice about money -- i.e. our consciousness is only concerned with the fact that this chicken is cheaper/est. But the key here is that it is still an ethical choice; it's just that the ethical has been moved into the unconscious, while our conscious is preoccupied with the question of price/money.
So a directed ethical unconscious, despite its appearances, wouldn't actually reduce the free will of the individual; rather, it would be emancipatory in the sense that ethical choices could be determined by collective political action rather than by the whims of the market.
I'll have to do some more thinking on this... And I really want to read Goodchild.
Sunday, July 18, 2010
Tuesday, June 22, 2010
Reading notes on Jesus and Marx - Ch. 1.2 "Challenge"
0
Ch. 1.2, pp. 5 - 10
Admittedly, there isn't too much going on in this section. Ellul merely outlines four challenges that Communism brings to Christianity: Justice, the significance of poverty, the relationship between practice/preaching (i.e. theory/praxis), and materialism.
With regard to the first, justice, Ellul points out that contemporary society is, in every way and on every level, unjust. Furthermore, since Christianity has been the dominant socio-cultural touchstone of Western society for the last twenty centuries, contemporary injustice is inextricably linked to the phenomenon of Christianity. Contemporary Christianity, as a whole, has made no effort to change this -- while Communism has.
The second:
That last phrase leads into the third challenge of Communism: the connection between theory and praxis, or -- put in more religious terms -- between preaching and practice. Ellul here notes that within Christianity the two are divorced: "We teach love our neighbor and we exploit him; we preach about justice and produce injustice, etc." To present the challenge of Communism, Ellul has to accept the "No real Communist society has ever existed" argument -- which is problematic in and of itself, as well as within the context of Ellul's work here -- but nevertheless he draws a reasonable line of connection within the tactical realm of Communism between theory and praxis: "If you take seriously what Marx, and later Lenin, wrote concerning tactics, you see that its applications in the Soviet Union and in Prague, the violation of rights in Poland in 1947, etc -- all these are perfectly consistent with their writings." (7)
The fourth challenge is, to me, the most interesting -- that is, the challenge of materialism. Now, in my experience, the conventional, contemporary "Christian" response to materialism (which, more often than not, is a response to a particularly dogmatic strand of scientific materialism) usually goes something like, "Oh, how terrible! You deny the spiritual realm, the realm of the unseen, and reduce all life to this dust that we are and that we inhabit! You are missing so much more!" Ellul's own response could not be further from this. He welcomes the challenge of materialism, claiming that it highlights the regression of Christianity into "a kind of disembodied spiritualism" that is totally contrary to the most basic elements of revelation -- i.e. the material and temporal intervention of God in the Old Testament, the material and temporal manifestation of God in the person of Jesus Christ, etc.
In Ellul's own words:
Now, some comments of my own:
At first glance, the first challenge seems fairly self-evident. Christianity has been dominant and injustice has thrived -- therefore, Christianity is linked to the thriving of injustice. However, this assertion is more problematic than it may first appear. The "Christianity has produced injustice" thesis, if taken in conjunction with a positive value judgment concerning the appropriateness of pursuing/salvaging/returning to/saving Christianity, necessitates that there be a fundamental disconnect between some "pure" kernel of Christianity -- Christianity as it should have been -- and its actual historical manifestation. In other words, if we admit that historically Christianity has been an indefensibly terrible thing, then we cannot defend the historical manifestation of Christianity -- we must instead appeal to some idealistic notion of a Christianity more like Christianity than itself. (Lacan tempts me here, but I shall restrict myself to Ellul's ground for the moment.)
This appeal to an ideal Christianity is parallel to another argument that Ellul is forced into accepting: that there never has been a true Communist society. Now, in a certain sense, this is of course true, because national Communist revolutions are by definition still constrained within the bourgeois framework of the nation-state -- the "true" Communist revolution must be global, or it is nothing. That being said, Ellul himself asserts a connection between theory and praxis within Communist history, so for our purposes, we cannot rule out the existence of -- as it were -- shades of Communism.
In turn, this reminds me of one of Žižek's observations concerning his youth in Yugoslavia: whenever something would go wrong, the leaders would assert that this was due to the country "not being Communist enough." A similar parallel can be seen in neo-liberal responses to the recent Great Recession: in their analysis, the recession was the result of the market "not being free enough" or America "not being capitalist enough." Now, in both of these cases, the ideological appeal is clear. It is not as if the historical manifestation of a system is the corrupt, ideologically contaminated version, while the ideal system is pure, etc; rather, the very appeal to an ideal is itself a contaminated, ideological move.
So can we not draw the same conclusions regarding the move to blame the failures of Christianity on "not being Christian enough?" Is not the appeal to an ideal, pure, unadulterated kernel of Christianity the ideological (and consequently, historically and politically bound) move par excellence? Should we not therefore be distrustful of perpetual calls to return to the practices of the early Church, ground ourselves in the "true essence" of Christianity, etc?
This is why Ellul's seemingly joyful embrace of the materialist challenge is most intriguing to me; if we name ideal Christianity as ideology, then we are left with the Pascallian/Althusserian/Žižekian reading of belief and action -- that is to say, beliefs/ideals exist only insomuch as they are manifest as actions, as interventions in the material world. If Christianity is truly materialist -- no, that is the wrong way to phrase it, because such a question appeals to an ideal -- if Christianity can become materialist (in a Lacanian sense of retroactive "quilting"), then it may be able to answer the four aforementioned challenges.
Admittedly, there isn't too much going on in this section. Ellul merely outlines four challenges that Communism brings to Christianity: Justice, the significance of poverty, the relationship between practice/preaching (i.e. theory/praxis), and materialism.
With regard to the first, justice, Ellul points out that contemporary society is, in every way and on every level, unjust. Furthermore, since Christianity has been the dominant socio-cultural touchstone of Western society for the last twenty centuries, contemporary injustice is inextricably linked to the phenomenon of Christianity. Contemporary Christianity, as a whole, has made no effort to change this -- while Communism has.
The second:
Christianity should have taken up the cause of the poor; better yet, it should have identified with the poor. Instead, during almost the entire course of its history, the Church has served as a prop of the powerful and has been on the side of exploiters and states. The Church is numbered among the "Powers"; it has sanctified the situation of the poverty-stricken." (Ellul, 6)Meanwhile, "Communism sides with the poor. [...] No matter what kind of poverty the poor suffer, the Communists are on their side, and the Communists are alone with them. Consequently, they accomplish what Christianity preaches but fails to practice." (6)
That last phrase leads into the third challenge of Communism: the connection between theory and praxis, or -- put in more religious terms -- between preaching and practice. Ellul here notes that within Christianity the two are divorced: "We teach love our neighbor and we exploit him; we preach about justice and produce injustice, etc." To present the challenge of Communism, Ellul has to accept the "No real Communist society has ever existed" argument -- which is problematic in and of itself, as well as within the context of Ellul's work here -- but nevertheless he draws a reasonable line of connection within the tactical realm of Communism between theory and praxis: "If you take seriously what Marx, and later Lenin, wrote concerning tactics, you see that its applications in the Soviet Union and in Prague, the violation of rights in Poland in 1947, etc -- all these are perfectly consistent with their writings." (7)
The fourth challenge is, to me, the most interesting -- that is, the challenge of materialism. Now, in my experience, the conventional, contemporary "Christian" response to materialism (which, more often than not, is a response to a particularly dogmatic strand of scientific materialism) usually goes something like, "Oh, how terrible! You deny the spiritual realm, the realm of the unseen, and reduce all life to this dust that we are and that we inhabit! You are missing so much more!" Ellul's own response could not be further from this. He welcomes the challenge of materialism, claiming that it highlights the regression of Christianity into "a kind of disembodied spiritualism" that is totally contrary to the most basic elements of revelation -- i.e. the material and temporal intervention of God in the Old Testament, the material and temporal manifestation of God in the person of Jesus Christ, etc.
In Ellul's own words:
[God] enters the concrete life of His people and does not withdraw them from the world. He participates in history. The entire Old Testament is political history and not at all religious. It exalts the body, love in its carnal reality (the Song of Solomon!), and shows that nothing is experienced without the body. There exists no separation between a soul one could consider important and a body looked on as vile and lowly. (7)
Now, some comments of my own:
At first glance, the first challenge seems fairly self-evident. Christianity has been dominant and injustice has thrived -- therefore, Christianity is linked to the thriving of injustice. However, this assertion is more problematic than it may first appear. The "Christianity has produced injustice" thesis, if taken in conjunction with a positive value judgment concerning the appropriateness of pursuing/salvaging/returning to/saving Christianity, necessitates that there be a fundamental disconnect between some "pure" kernel of Christianity -- Christianity as it should have been -- and its actual historical manifestation. In other words, if we admit that historically Christianity has been an indefensibly terrible thing, then we cannot defend the historical manifestation of Christianity -- we must instead appeal to some idealistic notion of a Christianity more like Christianity than itself. (Lacan tempts me here, but I shall restrict myself to Ellul's ground for the moment.)
This appeal to an ideal Christianity is parallel to another argument that Ellul is forced into accepting: that there never has been a true Communist society. Now, in a certain sense, this is of course true, because national Communist revolutions are by definition still constrained within the bourgeois framework of the nation-state -- the "true" Communist revolution must be global, or it is nothing. That being said, Ellul himself asserts a connection between theory and praxis within Communist history, so for our purposes, we cannot rule out the existence of -- as it were -- shades of Communism.
In turn, this reminds me of one of Žižek's observations concerning his youth in Yugoslavia: whenever something would go wrong, the leaders would assert that this was due to the country "not being Communist enough." A similar parallel can be seen in neo-liberal responses to the recent Great Recession: in their analysis, the recession was the result of the market "not being free enough" or America "not being capitalist enough." Now, in both of these cases, the ideological appeal is clear. It is not as if the historical manifestation of a system is the corrupt, ideologically contaminated version, while the ideal system is pure, etc; rather, the very appeal to an ideal is itself a contaminated, ideological move.
So can we not draw the same conclusions regarding the move to blame the failures of Christianity on "not being Christian enough?" Is not the appeal to an ideal, pure, unadulterated kernel of Christianity the ideological (and consequently, historically and politically bound) move par excellence? Should we not therefore be distrustful of perpetual calls to return to the practices of the early Church, ground ourselves in the "true essence" of Christianity, etc?
This is why Ellul's seemingly joyful embrace of the materialist challenge is most intriguing to me; if we name ideal Christianity as ideology, then we are left with the Pascallian/Althusserian/Žižekian reading of belief and action -- that is to say, beliefs/ideals exist only insomuch as they are manifest as actions, as interventions in the material world. If Christianity is truly materialist -- no, that is the wrong way to phrase it, because such a question appeals to an ideal -- if Christianity can become materialist (in a Lacanian sense of retroactive "quilting"), then it may be able to answer the four aforementioned challenges.
Saturday, May 1, 2010
Reading notes on Jesus and Marx: From Gospel to Ideology, by Jacques Ellul (p. 1-5)
0
It's been quite a spell since I last read any Ellul. In fact, my own intellectual appetites (i.e. Žižek) and opinions (i.e. Is technique subservient to capital, or vice versa?) have changed enough that reading him isn't quite the awing experience that it used to be... But I'm willing to give Ellul a chance, nonetheless.
I don't actually own a book copy of Jesus and Marx, but for a time Jesus Radicals had a section on Ellul that featured some of his out-of-print books as pdf files, and so I obtained a pdf copy. (The section is still there, but Jesus and Marx is not.) I've actually found going through the text in pdf form preferable to going through it in book form, because I tend to only print out a few pages at a time (and therefore go through the text slower and more methodically) and it's easier to write marginal notes on a sheet of paper than on book pages.
That being said, here are my notes for the first chapter:
Page 1:
Ellul's conception of ideology seems, to me, woefully inadequate. He first criticizes the myriad of meanings the word "ideology" can have, depending on the scholar, but then goes on to give a rather vague definition:
But Ellul's version of ideology becomes even more strange:
To be fair to Ellul, however, the ideology-free understanding of early capitalism makes some sense if ideology is confined to the sphere of explicit, popular doctrine. It's just that this version of ideology is vastly different than the kind of thing that they introduce into basic sociology courses -- and consequently, what I have in mind when I hear the world "ideology." I suppose this divergence of meaning could be attributed to the influence of Freudian theory of Marxism -- that is to say, the influence of the idea of the unconscious (this would certainly explain Žižek). Not having read Marx (oh, reading list!), I can't say whether this brief interpretation of the history of Marxist theory is accurate or not, but it's worth keeping in mind. Either way, I think it's good to permit at least one charitable reading of a text, so I'll proceed keeping Ellul's version of ideology in mind.
Pages 2 and 3:
Ellul recognizes Christianity as an ideology, but he distinguishes between Christianity-as-ideology and "pure" Christianity. (Perhaps in the same way he distinguishes between "pure" political doctrine and ideology?) For Ellul, "pure" Christianity -- I think it might be appropriate to use the Žižekian term, "kernel" -- is radically anti-ideological, in that "biblical revelation necessarily entails iconoclasm, that is, the destruction of all religions, beliefs, ideolatrous images, and fads." (2) (I'm thinking of Galations 3:28 here.) Furthermore, the kernel of Christianity is founded on radical God-given freedom. Consequently, the Christian (in the pure sense, not the ideological sense) is specifically called to critique ideology, because ideological confines attack Christian freedom.
This leads Ellul to acknowledge the epistemological problem I raised earlier: How to recognize ideology? Ellul nods his head to Marx and Nietzsche, saying that their critiques of Christianity (as ideology) are valid, but also argues that it would better if this work was taken up by Christians.
However, Ellul's formulation of the method of the Christian critique is rather vague. He mentions that Christians must stop reading the Bible to find arguments or justifications for their positions (because this merely produces ideology) and instead interact with the Bible as an kind of interrogation -- God questions the believer about their thoughts, behavior, church, etc. (I suppose this would be termed "conviction.") Furthermore, the believer must be sociologically aware -- i.e. of popular trends -- so that they may resist the alluring ideologies present in the mass actions (or inactions) of groups.
Pages 4 and 5:
Finally, Ellul remarks than critiques of ideology are historically specific, so the Christian critic must not think that their critique will be longstanding. Ellul points to Marx, who constructed a thorough, specific critique of his historical moment -- but this critique, when divorced from historical context, merely became an ideology. Christian critique of ideology, for Ellul, must always center on the present -- a present which is intimately connected to the future via the here-but-still-yet-to-come temporality of the Kingdom of God. Thus, the Christian critique of ideology is really prophecy -- that is, the understanding of the current historical moment in relation to the known future (i.e. the Kingdom of God).
This is all well and good, but I'm not sure how Ellul can even use the category of ideology, since it is rooted in a materialist theory (Marxism). Maybe this is at the heart of my confusion. Ellul doesn't seem to speak of ideology in material terms -- in contrast to the Althusserian understanding of ideology as always manifested in the material -- but rather in spiritual terms. I'm not sure if I think this is limiting or restricting... or neither.
Well, I'm only five pages into the book. I'm guessing he'll elaborate further.
I don't actually own a book copy of Jesus and Marx, but for a time Jesus Radicals had a section on Ellul that featured some of his out-of-print books as pdf files, and so I obtained a pdf copy. (The section is still there, but Jesus and Marx is not.) I've actually found going through the text in pdf form preferable to going through it in book form, because I tend to only print out a few pages at a time (and therefore go through the text slower and more methodically) and it's easier to write marginal notes on a sheet of paper than on book pages.
That being said, here are my notes for the first chapter:
Page 1:
Ellul's conception of ideology seems, to me, woefully inadequate. He first criticizes the myriad of meanings the word "ideology" can have, depending on the scholar, but then goes on to give a rather vague definition:
"An ideology is the popularized sentimental degeneration of a political doctrine or worldview; it involes a mixture of passions and rather incoherent elements, always related to present realities."(1)Note: Political doctrine is pure while ideology is not. Does this mean (unsullied) political doctrine is outside the realm of ideology?
But Ellul's version of ideology becomes even more strange:
"Often an ideology springs up to parry an ideology-free practice. Male domination for example, has no explicitly formulated ideology; feminist ideology arises to oppose it. Capitalism is a practice with no explicitly formulated ideology; socialist ideology arises to oppose it. Afterward, capitalism will produce an ideology of 'defense.'" (Ellul, 1)It seems that Ellul is mixing ontology and epistemology here. Just because early capitalism did not have an explicitly articulated ideology doesn't mean that the ideology did not exist. (Indeed, Žižek argues that we now experience ideology as non-ideology -- but let's not throw one thinker against another just yet.)
To be fair to Ellul, however, the ideology-free understanding of early capitalism makes some sense if ideology is confined to the sphere of explicit, popular doctrine. It's just that this version of ideology is vastly different than the kind of thing that they introduce into basic sociology courses -- and consequently, what I have in mind when I hear the world "ideology." I suppose this divergence of meaning could be attributed to the influence of Freudian theory of Marxism -- that is to say, the influence of the idea of the unconscious (this would certainly explain Žižek). Not having read Marx (oh, reading list!), I can't say whether this brief interpretation of the history of Marxist theory is accurate or not, but it's worth keeping in mind. Either way, I think it's good to permit at least one charitable reading of a text, so I'll proceed keeping Ellul's version of ideology in mind.
Pages 2 and 3:
Ellul recognizes Christianity as an ideology, but he distinguishes between Christianity-as-ideology and "pure" Christianity. (Perhaps in the same way he distinguishes between "pure" political doctrine and ideology?) For Ellul, "pure" Christianity -- I think it might be appropriate to use the Žižekian term, "kernel" -- is radically anti-ideological, in that "biblical revelation necessarily entails iconoclasm, that is, the destruction of all religions, beliefs, ideolatrous images, and fads." (2) (I'm thinking of Galations 3:28 here.) Furthermore, the kernel of Christianity is founded on radical God-given freedom. Consequently, the Christian (in the pure sense, not the ideological sense) is specifically called to critique ideology, because ideological confines attack Christian freedom.
This leads Ellul to acknowledge the epistemological problem I raised earlier: How to recognize ideology? Ellul nods his head to Marx and Nietzsche, saying that their critiques of Christianity (as ideology) are valid, but also argues that it would better if this work was taken up by Christians.
However, Ellul's formulation of the method of the Christian critique is rather vague. He mentions that Christians must stop reading the Bible to find arguments or justifications for their positions (because this merely produces ideology) and instead interact with the Bible as an kind of interrogation -- God questions the believer about their thoughts, behavior, church, etc. (I suppose this would be termed "conviction.") Furthermore, the believer must be sociologically aware -- i.e. of popular trends -- so that they may resist the alluring ideologies present in the mass actions (or inactions) of groups.
Pages 4 and 5:
Finally, Ellul remarks than critiques of ideology are historically specific, so the Christian critic must not think that their critique will be longstanding. Ellul points to Marx, who constructed a thorough, specific critique of his historical moment -- but this critique, when divorced from historical context, merely became an ideology. Christian critique of ideology, for Ellul, must always center on the present -- a present which is intimately connected to the future via the here-but-still-yet-to-come temporality of the Kingdom of God. Thus, the Christian critique of ideology is really prophecy -- that is, the understanding of the current historical moment in relation to the known future (i.e. the Kingdom of God).
This is all well and good, but I'm not sure how Ellul can even use the category of ideology, since it is rooted in a materialist theory (Marxism). Maybe this is at the heart of my confusion. Ellul doesn't seem to speak of ideology in material terms -- in contrast to the Althusserian understanding of ideology as always manifested in the material -- but rather in spiritual terms. I'm not sure if I think this is limiting or restricting... or neither.
Well, I'm only five pages into the book. I'm guessing he'll elaborate further.
Thursday, April 8, 2010
A new quarter begins... (or rather, began)
0
Well, my massive reading project pretty much completely stalled over Spring break. (That's what working 50 hours a week will do.) I only got through one of my initial four books. I'm not terribly surprised, but ah well...
My schedule is pretty busy for this term as well, so I don't really expect to have a lot of free time to devote to pleasure reading. That being said, I do have quite a bit of reading to do for school, so I figure I might as well try to make a habit out of blogging about that.
This term, I'm taking:
A course on the history of ancient philosophy. (Reading: Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics.)
A general lit crit course... Basically just an overview of a lot of stuff I've picked up indirectly. (Reading: Rivkin and Ryan's Literary Theory: An Anthology. A text that, I might add, strikes me as quite absurd. Heidegger in a page and a half? Why bother including him at all?)
A seminar on race and spatial regimes. (Reading: For the moment, Omi and Winant's Racial Formation in the United States.)
And my final Soc course... Globalization. (Reading: McMichael's Development and Social Change... A text so rooted in identity politics that I wish I hadn't listened to all those Žižek lectures.)
I have high hopes for my phil course (took Philosophy of Social Science with the same professor... very rigorous and challenging) and my seminar. The other two... Meh. I suppose I should be thankful that they require so little.
My schedule is pretty busy for this term as well, so I don't really expect to have a lot of free time to devote to pleasure reading. That being said, I do have quite a bit of reading to do for school, so I figure I might as well try to make a habit out of blogging about that.
This term, I'm taking:
A course on the history of ancient philosophy. (Reading: Plato's Republic and Aristotle's Politics.)
A general lit crit course... Basically just an overview of a lot of stuff I've picked up indirectly. (Reading: Rivkin and Ryan's Literary Theory: An Anthology. A text that, I might add, strikes me as quite absurd. Heidegger in a page and a half? Why bother including him at all?)
A seminar on race and spatial regimes. (Reading: For the moment, Omi and Winant's Racial Formation in the United States.)
And my final Soc course... Globalization. (Reading: McMichael's Development and Social Change... A text so rooted in identity politics that I wish I hadn't listened to all those Žižek lectures.)
I have high hopes for my phil course (took Philosophy of Social Science with the same professor... very rigorous and challenging) and my seminar. The other two... Meh. I suppose I should be thankful that they require so little.
Friday, March 26, 2010
Thoughts on Shutter Island [SPOILER ALERT]
0
So it's been a while now since Shutter Island debuted in theaters. It's also been a while since I've seen the film, so the details of chronology and so on are a bit blurry. But one thing does stand out in my memory: The incredibly clever joke the film plays on the audience.
The film turns on one key question: Is the protagonist insane, or is he trapped in a vast conspiracy? The audience is driven back and forth between these two points for the majority of the film. Indeed, for most of the movie either is at least somewhat plausible. But by the end of the film, we (the audience) have decided. The truth is clear: The protagonist is choosing the coherence of insanity, if only to avoid being a monster.
And this is precisely the joke of it all. We've decided on a reality within the film. But it is a film. It's not real. We, just like the protagonist, have created a particular coherence out of something that is not coherent and not real.
Thus, it is we that are proven to be "insane".
The film turns on one key question: Is the protagonist insane, or is he trapped in a vast conspiracy? The audience is driven back and forth between these two points for the majority of the film. Indeed, for most of the movie either is at least somewhat plausible. But by the end of the film, we (the audience) have decided. The truth is clear: The protagonist is choosing the coherence of insanity, if only to avoid being a monster.
And this is precisely the joke of it all. We've decided on a reality within the film. But it is a film. It's not real. We, just like the protagonist, have created a particular coherence out of something that is not coherent and not real.
Thus, it is we that are proven to be "insane".
Thursday, March 4, 2010
We are beggars all
0
So I picked up the latest album from Thrice (a band that I have fallen away from over the last few years, but was my absolute favorite in high school). In short: It rocks my socks off. Musically and lyrically, this is standout stuff. The lyrics of one song in particular have really been challenging me, in that they've served as an articulation of some emotions that have been rolling around inside me for quite some time.
Here's the lyrics (all copyrights reserved by Thrice, etc):
Here's the lyrics (all copyrights reserved by Thrice, etc):
Beggars
All you great men of power, you who boast of your feats -
Politicians and entrepreneurs.
Can you safeguard your breath in the night while you sleep?
Keep your heart beating steady and sure?
As you lie in your bed, does the thought haunt your head
That you’re really, rather small?
If there’s one thing I know in this life: we are beggars all.
All you champions of science and rulers of men,
Can you summon the sun from its sleep?
Does the earth seek your counsel on how fast to spin?
Can you shut up the gates of the deep?
Don’t you know that all things hang, as if by a string,
O’er the darkness - poised to fall?
If there’s one thing I know in this life: we are beggars all.
All you big shots that swagger and stride with conceit,
Did you devise how your frame would be formed?
If you’d be raised in a palace, or live out in the streets,
Did you choose the place or the hour you’d be born?
Tell me what can you claim? Not a thing - not your name!
Tell me if you can recall just one thing,
That’s not a gift in this life?
Can you hear what’s been said?
Can you see now that everything’s grace after all?
If there’s one thing I know in this life: we are beggars all.
Saturday, February 27, 2010
Promising Genomics [Finished]
0
I've finished reading Michael Fortun's Promising Genomics. That's the last of my "required reading" for this term -- i.e. reading for school rather than pleasure -- which hopefully means I'll have more time to direct towards my new reading program.
Finished another chapter of Ford's Theology. So far, not much to write home about. I guess I was expecting more of a general introduction to theological terms, discourse, etc. Ford's approach, however, seems much more subjective than that. But I've only scratched the surface, so I'll give him the benefit of the doubt thus far.
Finished another chapter of Ford's Theology. So far, not much to write home about. I guess I was expecting more of a general introduction to theological terms, discourse, etc. Ford's approach, however, seems much more subjective than that. But I've only scratched the surface, so I'll give him the benefit of the doubt thus far.
Friday, February 26, 2010
How to Read Freud [Finished]
0
Finished How to Read Freud this morning. I found the last couple chapters -- which dealt with the drives -- to be a bit more opaque than the beginning of the book, but that's probably just because I've really only actually read Freud's early works.
Next on my Freud list will be Freud: A Very Short Introduction, by Anthony Storr... But I won't be getting into that book until I finish the others that I am currently reading.
Next on my Freud list will be Freud: A Very Short Introduction, by Anthony Storr... But I won't be getting into that book until I finish the others that I am currently reading.
Thursday, February 25, 2010
Currently Reading [Part I]
0
Update:
I've read the first chapter of Prometheus Wired, I've almost finished with the introductory section of Saussure's Course, and I'm about three quarters through How to Read Freud. (Haven't got Theology yet -- though I ordered it through the university library system.)
So far, How to Read Freud seems to be an excellent primer to Freud, although it is certainly not strong enough to stand on its own. Indeed, the book demands an independent, critical reading of Freud's own texts. As far as content goes, I'm increasingly intrigued by the (much simplified, I'm sure) Freudian idea of all love being an attempt to "get back to" the original mother-child sexual configuration, particularly because my own reflections have hinted in that direction (although I did not take my conclusions all the way back into infancy).
As I wrote in my journal last August (and now edit slightly for the sake of public eyes):
I've read the first chapter of Prometheus Wired, I've almost finished with the introductory section of Saussure's Course, and I'm about three quarters through How to Read Freud. (Haven't got Theology yet -- though I ordered it through the university library system.)
So far, How to Read Freud seems to be an excellent primer to Freud, although it is certainly not strong enough to stand on its own. Indeed, the book demands an independent, critical reading of Freud's own texts. As far as content goes, I'm increasingly intrigued by the (much simplified, I'm sure) Freudian idea of all love being an attempt to "get back to" the original mother-child sexual configuration, particularly because my own reflections have hinted in that direction (although I did not take my conclusions all the way back into infancy).
As I wrote in my journal last August (and now edit slightly for the sake of public eyes):
"On the whole, I look at life as a series of steadily degrading experiences -- nothing of the future can ever compare to the simplicity of childhood play... The problem, of course, is that childhood, first naïve love, etc are always drowned in desire for the future. One spends childhood imitating and desiring adulthood, and so squanders its simplicity. Likewise, the beauty of the first love lies directly in its prohibition; to consummate it renders it far too earthy, material, and obscene. A consummated first love is no first love at all; it destroys itself while birthing another.
Nostalgia.
Prohibition.
Is not nostalgia a way to relive the prohibitions of childhood and first love -- except that the original prohibitions are exchanged for the prohibition of time? I.e. "You may appreciate it fully now, but only from the distance designated by the intermediary of time!"
Of course, we constantly try to bridge this distance. Every time I've gone longboarding on the Discovery Trail has been an attempt to reclaim the tall dune grass, the smooth pavement, and the cool sea breeze that is fixed into my memory as a record of last August...
And if life is most fully expressed in nostalgia -- that is, the desire for the unreachable, the unattainable... What then?"
Thursday, February 18, 2010
Reading plan
0
I tend to make huge "To Read" lists (emphasis on huge) that I never (really) carry through with. You'd think I'd have learned my lesson by now. But no. I've done it again. However, rather than posting it in its monstrous entirety (allowing you to laugh at me when I fail miserably), I've decided to reveal only three books at a time. Once I finish these three, I will reveal three more. I've organized my list into three columns -- one for a major thinker (Freud, Marx, etc), one for foundational texts of technology/media studies (starting around the beginning of the 20th century), and one for (relatively) contemporary technology/media studies (starting around the beginning of the 21st century). I'll select one text from each column, so that -- hopefully -- my knowledge of general theory, historical developments in technology/media studies, and contemporary technology/media studies will grow as one.
EDIT: I've added a "Theology/Religious Studies" category to the list, making a total of four books to be read at a time.
For now, the theoretical thinker I'm concentrating on is Freud. Even though I've read some of his works for this seminar, I'm going back and starting with a general primer.
Here are the books I'm currently attacking for this project:
How to Read Freud, Joshua Cohen
Course in General Linguistics, Ferdinand De Saussure
Prometheus Wired, Darin Barney
Theology: A Very Short Introduction, David F. Ford
EDIT: I've added a "Theology/Religious Studies" category to the list, making a total of four books to be read at a time.
For now, the theoretical thinker I'm concentrating on is Freud. Even though I've read some of his works for this seminar, I'm going back and starting with a general primer.
Here are the books I'm currently attacking for this project:
How to Read Freud, Joshua Cohen
Course in General Linguistics, Ferdinand De Saussure
Prometheus Wired, Darin Barney
Theology: A Very Short Introduction, David F. Ford
Response to Dora
0
Well, now enough time has elapsed that my initial impressions concerning Dora have faded and my observations have become muddled. So this will be hardly be the essay-length response I envisioned it to be... but in the interest of getting this monkey off my back:
I greatly appreciate how Freud is continually modeling the processes he describes in his own texts. Since I'm new to Freud's work (and psychoanalysis in general) I really could only detect the processes from Dreams (Freud's subtle invocation of secondary revision stood out particularly strong in the "Prefatory Remarks" section) although now that I've finished the text and have been introduced to transference as a psychoanalytic concept, I see that Freud was modeling it in the text all along (or is that just my own secondary revision...?).
All in all, this makes plain the necessity of reading each of Freud's work more than once. Dreams certainly wouldn't have made a bit of sense (especially that infamous "Dark Forest" at the beginning!) if I hadn't gone through it twice (once last term on my own, and again this term for this Freud seminar), and I'm sure that Dora would be much more lucid if I had the time to go through it again as well.
...but alas, that's not going to happen anytime soon. C'est la vie d'un étudiant, non?
I greatly appreciate how Freud is continually modeling the processes he describes in his own texts. Since I'm new to Freud's work (and psychoanalysis in general) I really could only detect the processes from Dreams (Freud's subtle invocation of secondary revision stood out particularly strong in the "Prefatory Remarks" section) although now that I've finished the text and have been introduced to transference as a psychoanalytic concept, I see that Freud was modeling it in the text all along (or is that just my own secondary revision...?).
All in all, this makes plain the necessity of reading each of Freud's work more than once. Dreams certainly wouldn't have made a bit of sense (especially that infamous "Dark Forest" at the beginning!) if I hadn't gone through it twice (once last term on my own, and again this term for this Freud seminar), and I'm sure that Dora would be much more lucid if I had the time to go through it again as well.
...but alas, that's not going to happen anytime soon. C'est la vie d'un étudiant, non?
Tuesday, February 9, 2010
Blogging Dora, Part [?]
0
This term, I'm taking a seminar on Freud -- and loving every minute of it. (Freud is such a clever -- and creepy -- writer!) I've already made my way through Dreams, and this week I read Dora. I had planned to type up some thoughts on Dora as I was going through the text, but I got through it surprisingly quickly (it's a much faster read than Dreams) and as such, I wasn't as thorough in my note-taking. Instead of composing several posts on different sections of Dora, I think I'll just dedicate a single post to a variety of bits that jumped out at me.
But, no time for that now. Biopolitics calls me. Dora can wait until this afternoon. Or, more realistically, a few days from now.
But, no time for that now. Biopolitics calls me. Dora can wait until this afternoon. Or, more realistically, a few days from now.
Thursday, January 28, 2010
Propaganda and the Problem of Blogging
0
Someday, I'm going to get through Ellul's Propaganda. I've started and stopped a dozen times, but his style reads like a finished game of Tetris (at least in his sociological works -- his theological stuff is much more fluid) and it's just difficult to break it apart and get into it.
But in the meantime, knowing that Ellul's definition of propaganda is rather broad (we're not talking war bonds posters here; think some more along the lines of the Foucault's conception of power as relational), I stumble upon this question:
How does the contemporary intellectual avoid perpetuating their own propaganda?
I suspect Ellul's response would be somewhere along the lines of "Know your enslavement to technique/propaganda" and/or his maxim of "Think globally; act locally". The two are interrelated, really.
But isn't the act of writing (and, to a greater extent, publishing) an act that moves beyond the local? Should contemporary intellectual culture become an oral culture (and thus more local)? Is orality even possible in contemporary culture?
Hmm.
But in the meantime, knowing that Ellul's definition of propaganda is rather broad (we're not talking war bonds posters here; think some more along the lines of the Foucault's conception of power as relational), I stumble upon this question:
How does the contemporary intellectual avoid perpetuating their own propaganda?
I suspect Ellul's response would be somewhere along the lines of "Know your enslavement to technique/propaganda" and/or his maxim of "Think globally; act locally". The two are interrelated, really.
But isn't the act of writing (and, to a greater extent, publishing) an act that moves beyond the local? Should contemporary intellectual culture become an oral culture (and thus more local)? Is orality even possible in contemporary culture?
Hmm.
Saturday, January 16, 2010
scienceXrhetoric
0
One of the classes that I'm taking this term goes by the ambiguous name of Biopolitics*. In essence, it's an interdisciplinary STS-type course that looks at the ways in which advances in contemporary biology are influenced by and have influenced various elements of society. The main text for the course is Michael Fortun's Promising Genomics: Iceland and deCODE Genetics in a World of Speculation. I'm only a chapter into the book so far, but even so it's clear that Fortun is a talented writer. Although he makes the argument (more or less explicitly) that science and rhetoric are deeply connected in the unstable, undecided world of contemporary genetic research, the first chapter of Promising Genomics, in a beautiful rhetorical move, demonstrates this structurally -- both on a macro level (the overall structure of the chapter) and on a micro level (through the use of chiasma, displayed in a scientific manner but utilized in a rhetorical manner).
Brilliant as the book may be, the course as a whole has been moving rather slowly. I suppose I should have expected as much, since it's only a junior-level course, and most of the people in the class have no previous training in HPS or STS. However, the slow pace of the course does have one advantage: It's allowed for extended reflection on the material that we have covered.
Over the last two weeks, much of our discussion has revolved around the difference between two models of scientific practice. The movement from Model 1 to Model 2 is fundamentally one of destabilization, in that the rigid systems and hierarchies of Model 1 are replaced with the interrelated actors of Model 2, each of which contribute to the formation and movement of the others.
What I find most interesting about this shift -- this act of destabilization -- is that the second model includes an ethical critique and demand that is not present (or perhaps is present, but hidden) in the first model. Model 2 places research practices, academic disciplines, political institutions, and media outlets in mutually influential relation to one another. Thus, any change in one area effects a change in another. Or, to take it further, any perceived change in one area effects change in another. It is this element of perception (which is closely linked to the subjectivity of the promise) that includes the ethical critiqueXdemand: Scientists should not only be concerned with the ethics of their methodological practice, but also with the ethics of their rhetorical practice. In other words, how they speak (whether amongst themselves, or to Congress, or to the public, etc.) is as important as what they do, precisely because it is the subjectivity of perception that drives the system, rather than the concrete accumulation of facts. It is for this reason that the truly important moment for the Human Genome Project was the joint press conference announcing the project's completion, rather than the actual completion of the project itself, which, in the case of one of the parties competing to complete the HGP, came somewhat later.
But what does this mean for the future of genomics? Any rhetorical move implies the existence of competing discourses. With this in mind, it seems safe to assert that the current state of affairs in genomics -- laden with rhetoric as it is -- is a myriad of competing discourses. But isn't the progression of science from complicated uncertainty to black-box, textbook-style facts itself dependent on the establishment of a hegemonic discourse in which (explicit) rhetorical moves play less and less of a role? If anything, the rapid progress of genomics research has only multiplied the range of discourses present at any one particular time, thus moving genomics even further from the hegemony necessary to pin down "facts" methodologically and rhetorically -- and consequently, further into territory in which the scientist is responsible not only for what he or she does, but what he or she says (and how he or she says it). The future is, of course, up for grabs, but if current trends continue it seems that the outcome may be an expression of science radically different than that of the traditional textbook-dissemination model.
*So far, the course seems to be unrelated to the Foucauldian sense of this term.
Brilliant as the book may be, the course as a whole has been moving rather slowly. I suppose I should have expected as much, since it's only a junior-level course, and most of the people in the class have no previous training in HPS or STS. However, the slow pace of the course does have one advantage: It's allowed for extended reflection on the material that we have covered.
Over the last two weeks, much of our discussion has revolved around the difference between two models of scientific practice. The movement from Model 1 to Model 2 is fundamentally one of destabilization, in that the rigid systems and hierarchies of Model 1 are replaced with the interrelated actors of Model 2, each of which contribute to the formation and movement of the others.
What I find most interesting about this shift -- this act of destabilization -- is that the second model includes an ethical critique and demand that is not present (or perhaps is present, but hidden) in the first model. Model 2 places research practices, academic disciplines, political institutions, and media outlets in mutually influential relation to one another. Thus, any change in one area effects a change in another. Or, to take it further, any perceived change in one area effects change in another. It is this element of perception (which is closely linked to the subjectivity of the promise) that includes the ethical critiqueXdemand: Scientists should not only be concerned with the ethics of their methodological practice, but also with the ethics of their rhetorical practice. In other words, how they speak (whether amongst themselves, or to Congress, or to the public, etc.) is as important as what they do, precisely because it is the subjectivity of perception that drives the system, rather than the concrete accumulation of facts. It is for this reason that the truly important moment for the Human Genome Project was the joint press conference announcing the project's completion, rather than the actual completion of the project itself, which, in the case of one of the parties competing to complete the HGP, came somewhat later.
But what does this mean for the future of genomics? Any rhetorical move implies the existence of competing discourses. With this in mind, it seems safe to assert that the current state of affairs in genomics -- laden with rhetoric as it is -- is a myriad of competing discourses. But isn't the progression of science from complicated uncertainty to black-box, textbook-style facts itself dependent on the establishment of a hegemonic discourse in which (explicit) rhetorical moves play less and less of a role? If anything, the rapid progress of genomics research has only multiplied the range of discourses present at any one particular time, thus moving genomics even further from the hegemony necessary to pin down "facts" methodologically and rhetorically -- and consequently, further into territory in which the scientist is responsible not only for what he or she does, but what he or she says (and how he or she says it). The future is, of course, up for grabs, but if current trends continue it seems that the outcome may be an expression of science radically different than that of the traditional textbook-dissemination model.
*So far, the course seems to be unrelated to the Foucauldian sense of this term.
The Contract
0"This is also what I see as something relatively dangerous [on the Internet]. When you share your private dreams, you may communicate with millions -- but this is not public. This is a kind of universalized private space."
- Slavoj Žižek
Notes Toward a Definition of Communist Culture: Populism and Democracy (Lecture at the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities, 18 June 2009)
With this quote in mind, I initiate this contract.
The details are simple: I am a twenty-something undergraduate student in Portland, Oregon. I am pursuing a major in Sociology, and two minors: English and the History and Philosophy of Science. I have aspirations that involve academia. My current research interests center on the Internet and self-representation, with a particular emphasis on weblogs. In fidelity to these interests, I have decided to actively engage in that which I study -- to become a participant observer. In addition, I hope that the regular reflection necessitated by this practice will be to my personal and intellectual benefit. Perhaps, given enough time, this regular reflection will breed sustained interaction and engagement with you, my implicit reader.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
Posts
